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A DEBT MANAGEMENT PROBLEM WITH CURRENCY
DEVALUATION
ANTONIO MARIGONDA AND KHAI T. NGUYEN
Abstract. We consider a model of debt management, where a sovereign state trade
some bonds to service the debt with a pool of risk-neutral competitive foreign investors.
At each time, the government decides which fraction of the gross domestic product (GDP)
must be used to repay the debt, and how much to devaluate its currency. Both these
operations have the effect to reduce the actual size of the debt, but have a social cost
in terms of welfare sustainability. Moreover, at any time the sovereign state can declare
bankruptcy by paying a correspondent bankruptcy cost. We show that this optimization
problems admits an equilibrium solution, leading to bankruptcy or to a stationary state,
depending on the initial conditions.
1. Introduction
According to US Senate Levin-Coburn Report [10], the financial crisis of 2007-2008,
which originated the worldwide Great Recession of 2008–2012 and to the European sov-
ereign debt crisis of 2010-2012, and whose effects are still present in many countries, “was
not a natural disaster, but the result of high risk, complex financial products, undisclosed
conflicts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market
itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street.” The first part of the report analyze some topic
cases of
(1) High Risk Lending;
(2) Regulatory Failure;
(3) Inflated Credit Ratings;
(4) Investment Bank Abuses.
In the final recommendation of the report, a whole section is devoted to the management
of high risk lending, in order to prevent abuses.
In the Eurozone, the crisis - whose consequences lasted until 2016 - took the form of a
speculative attack to the sovereign debt of some EU countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece,
Spain), but also strongly affects also two major economic powers like Italy and France.
The undertaken actions of the EU governments to face the crisis had very high social
costs, leading also to an heavy political impact. These considerations lead to the following
natural problems:
• to identify suitable tools to estimate the risk of a lender’s bankruptcy (as in the
subprime mortgage crisis, which originated);
• to have quantitative tools, relying on reliable prediction of realistic models, which
would allow the regulation authority to prevent abuses;
• to provide optimal strategies in the management of sovreign debts.
In [12], the authors introduced a variational model where a government issues nominal
defaultable debt and chooses fiscal and monetary policy under discretion. In particular,
to reduce the actual size of the debt, the government can choose to devaluate its currency,
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producing inflaction and thus increasing the welfare cost and negatively affecting the trust
of the investors, or to rely only on fiscal policy to serve the debt. The government can also
declare the default, which imply to pay a bankruptcy cost due to the temporary exclusion
from capital markets, and a drop in the output endowment. The aim is to find a strategy
minimizing a cost functional dealing with the trade-off between inflaction, social costs, and
debt sustainability and possibly declaring the default if this option would me preferable to
continue servicing the debt.
The analysis of the model in [12] was performed by a numerical methods, and as a final
conclusion of their analysis, the authors claim that the tool of currency devaluation, though
useful in a short-term perspective, is not recommended unless the government is able to
make credible commitments about their future inflaction policy. In this sense, it is worth of
notice that many countries with limited inflaction credibility, decide either to issue bonds
directly in a foreign stable currency (e.g., US dollars), or delegates the monetary policy to
an independent authority with a strong anti-inflaction commitment (e.g., Eurozone Central
Bank).
An analytical study of a variant of the model in [12] was performed in [5], in the case
where no currency devaluation is available to the governement, and provided a semi-explicit
formula for the optimal strategy in the deterministic case (i.e., when the GDP evolves
deterministically).
This paper aims to develop the analytical study of the model in [5], allowing also the
possibility of currency devaluation as in [12].
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the stochastic model
together with the main assumptions, in Section 3 we prove the existence of an equilibrium
solution for the stochastic model as the steady state of an auxiliary parabolic system, and
study its asymptotic behaviour as the maximum debt-to-income threshold is pushed to+∞.
In Section 4 we study the deterministic model obtaining by setting the volatility σ = 0. In
this case we provide a semi-explicit construction for an equilibrium solution, together with
a study of its asymptotic behaviour as the maximum debt-to-income threshold is pushed
to +∞.
2. A model with stochastic growth
In this section, we develop the model in [5], allowing the possibility of currency deval-
uation as in [12]. Here the borrower is a sovereign state, that can decide to devaluate its
currency (for example, printing more paper money). The total income Y , i.e., the gross
national product GDP measured in terms of the floating currency unit, can quickly increase
if the currency is devaluated, producing inflation. It is governed by a stochastic process
dY (t) = (µ + v(t))Y (t) dt+ σY (t) dW
where W is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability space and
• µ = average growth rate of the economy;
• σ = the volatility;
• v(t) ≥ 0 = the devaluation rate at time t, regarded as an additional control.
We refer to [12] for a more detailed derivation v in the above system from economic
primitives.
Let X(t) be the outstanding stock of nominal government bonds, expressed in the local
currency unit. In particular, X(t) represents also the total nominal value of the outstanding
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debt. To service the debt, the government trades a nominal non-contingent bond with
risk-neutral competitive foreign investors. In case of bankruptcy, the lenders recover only
a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1] of their outstanding capital, depending on the total amount of the
debt at the time of bankruptcy. To offset this possible loss, the buys a bond with unit
nominal value at a discounted price p ∈ [0, 1]. We denote by U(t) the rate of payments
that the borrower chooses to make to the lenders at time t. If this amount is not enough
to cover the running interest and pay back part of the principal, new bonds are issued, at
the discounted price p(t). As in [5], the nominal value of the outstanding debt thus evolves
according to
X˙(t) = −λX(t) + (λ+ r)X(t)− U(t)
p(t)
.
Here the constants
• λ = rate at which the borrower pays back the principal;
• r = discount rate .
The debt-to-GDP ratio (DTI) is defined as x = X/Y . By Ito¯’s formula [13, 14], the
evolution of x(·) is
(2.1) dx(t) =
[(
λ+ r
p(t)
− λ+ σ2 − µ− v(t)
)
x(t)− u(t)
p(t)
]
dt− σ x(t) dW,
where u = U/Y ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the total income allocated to reduce the debt.
Throughout the following we will assume that r > µ.
In this model, the borrower has three controls: at each time t he can decide the portion
u(t) of the total income is allocated to repaying the debt, he can decide the devaluation
rate v(t) and he can also decide the time Tb he is going to declare bankruptcy, paying a
bankruptcy cost. More precisely, we assume that
• there exists a threshold x∗ > 0 such that if x(t) reaches x∗ then the borrower is
forced to declare bankruptcy;
• the borrower decides to declare bankruptcy as soon as x(t) reaches x′, where
x′ ∈ [0, x∗] is an additional control parameter, chosen by the borrower in order
to minimize his expected cost;
• the optimal control has feedback form, so that
u = u∗(x), v = v∗(x) for x ∈ [0, x′],
where u∗ ∈ U := {u : [0, x′] → [0, 1] measurable} and v∗ ∈ V := {v : [0, x′] →
[0,+∞[ measurable}.
In this case the random variable bankruptcy time is
Tb
.
= inf {t > 0 : x(t) = x′} ,
and the total expected cost to the borrower, exponentially discounted in time, is
J [x0, x
′, u∗, v∗] = E
[∫ Tb
0
e−rt
[
L(u∗(x(t))) + c(v∗(x(t)))
]
dt+ e−rTbB
]
x(0)=x0
,
where
• B is the bankruptcy cost, which summarizes the penalties of temporary exclusion
from the capital markets, the bad reputation among the investors, and the social
costs of the default;
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• c(v) is a social cost resulting by devaluation, i.e., the increasing cost of the welfare
and of the imported goods;
• L(u) is the cost for the borrower to implement the control u, i.e., adversion toward
austerity policies and welfare’s budget cuts.
By a Dynamic Programming argument, it is never convenient for the borrower to declare
bankruptcy unless he is not forced to do so, i.e., unless the threshold x∗ is reached. This
argument is a slight variant of [5].
Lemma 2.1. For any admissible control strategy (u′(·), v′(·)) declaring bankruptcy at x =
x′ < x∗, there exists a control strategy with smaller cost declaring bankruptcy at x = x∗.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that the borrower implement any strategy and decide to
declare bankruptcy when reaching x = x′ < x∗. Denote by T the time when he declares
bankruptcy and let J be the cost of this strategy up to time T . The total cost is then
J + e−rTB. We can construct a better strategy simply avoiding to declare bankruptcy at
x′, and switching off the controls (u∗, v∗) after having reached x′ until the threshold x∗ is
reached. In this case, the total cost before T is the same as before, and the total cost is
J + E
[
e−rT
∗
b B
]
= < J +
[
e−r(T
∗
b −T )
]
· e−rTB < J + e−rTB
where
(2.2) T ∗b
.
= inf{t > 0 : x(t) = x∗}.
Thus from now on we assume that the borrower will declare bankruptcy exactly at time
t = T ∗b . Moreover, the goal of the borrower is to
(2.3) minimize: J [x0, x
∗, u∗, v∗]
= E
[∫ T ∗b
0
e−rt
[
L(u∗(x(t))) + c(v∗(x(t)))
]
dt+ e−rTbB
]
x(0)=x0
.
To complete the model, we need an equation determining the discounted bond price p in
the evolution equation (2.1). For every x > 0, let θ(x) be the salvage rate, i.e. the fraction
of the outstanding capital that can be recovered by lenders, if bankruptcy occurs when the
debt has size x∗. As in [5], assuming that the investors are risk-neutral, the discounted
bond price coincides with the expected payoff to a lender purchasing a coupon with unit
nominal value
(2.4) p(x0) = E
[ ∫ T ∗b
0
(r + λ) exp
{
−
∫ t
0
(
λ+ r + v∗(x(s))
)
ds
}
dt
+ exp
{
−
∫ Tb
0
(r + λ+ v∗(x(t)))dt
}
· θ(x∗)
]
x(0)=x0
for every initial debt x0 ∈ [0, x∗].
Having described the model, we can introduce the definition of optimal solution, in
feedback form.
Definition 2.2 (Stochastic optimal feedback solution). In connection with the above
model, we say that a triple of functions u = u∗(x), v = v∗(x) p = p(x) provides an
optimal solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)–(2.4) if
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(i) Given the function p(·), for every initial value x0 ∈ [0, x∗] the feedback control
(u∗(·), v∗(·)) with stopping time T ∗b as in (2.2) provides an optimal solution to the
stochastic control problem (2.3), with dynamics (2.1).
(ii) Given the feedback control u∗(·) and the set S, for every initial value x0 the dis-
counted price p(x0) satisfies (2.4), where T
∗
b is the stopping time (2.2) determined
by the dynamics (2.1).
The value function of the control system (2.1) with the cost J in (2.3) is defined by
(2.5) V (x0) = inf
(u∗,v∗)∈U×V
J [x0, x
∗, u∗, v∗] .
In the following we shall assume that
(A1) The implementing cost function L is twice continuously differentiable for u ∈ [0, 1[
and satisfies
(2.6) L(0) = 0, L′ > 0, L′′ > δ0 > 0 and lim
u→1−
L(u) = +∞.
(A2) The social cost c(·) determined by currency devaluation is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable and satisfies
(2.7) c(0) = 0, c′(v) > 0 and c′′(v) > δ0 > 0 .
for some constant δ0 > 0.
Calling B a fixed (large) cost associated with bankruptcy, under the above assumptions,
we have
V (0) = 0 and V (x∗) = B.
Denote by
L∗(ρ)
.
= sup
u∈[0,1]
{ρu− L(u)}, c∗(ρ) .= sup
v≥0
{ρv − c(v)},
the Legendre transform of L and c. By the strict convexity of L and c, for every ρ there
exist unique uρ ∈ [0, 1] and vρ ≥ 0 such that L∗(ρ) +L(uρ) = ρuρ and c∗(ρ)+ c(vρ) = ρvρ.
They can be characterized by the relations
uρ =

(L′)−1(ρ), if ρ > L′(0),
0, if ρ ≤ L′(0),
vρ =

(c′)−1(ρ), if ρ > c′(0),
0, if ρ ≤ c′(0).
The Hamiltonian associated to the dynamics (2.1) and the cost functions L, c in (2.3) is
(2.8) H(x, ξ, p)
.
= −L∗
(
ξ
p
)
− c∗(xξ) +
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x ξ .
The necessary conditions for optimality imply that the value function V should solve the
second order implicit ODE
(2.9) rV (x) = H(x, V ′(x), p(x)) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′(x),
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and the feedback strategies, by (A1) and (A2), are
u∗(x) := argmin
u∈[0,1]
{
L(u)− u
p(x)
V ′(x)
}
=

0, if
V ′(x)
p(x)
≤ L′(0),
(L′)−1
(
V ′(x)
p(x)
)
, if
V ′(x)
p(x)
> L′(0),
(2.10)
v∗(x) := argmin
v≥0
{
c(v)− vxV ′(x)} =

0, if V ′(x)x ≤ c′(0) ,
(c′)−1 (V ′(x)x) , if V ′(x)x > c′(0).
(2.11)
On the other hand, if the feedback controls u = u∗(x) and v = v∗(x) are known, then by
using Feynman-Kac formula, we obtain the second order nonlinear ODE for the discounted
bond price p in (2.4)
(2.12) (r + λ+ v∗(x))p(x) − (r + λ)
=
[(
λ+ r
p(x)
− λ+ σ2 − µ− v∗(x)
)
x− u
∗(x)
p(x)
]
· p′(x) + (σx)
2
2
p′′(x),
with boundary values p(0) = 1, p(x∗) = θ(x∗). Recalling 2.8 and (2.10), a direct compu-
tation yields
(2.13) Hξ(x, V
′, p) =
(
λ+ r
p(x)
− λ+ σ2 − µ− v∗(x)
)
x− u
∗(x)
p(x)
,
and
(2.14) Hp(x, V
′, p) = (u∗(x)− x(λ+ r)) · V
′
p2
.
Combining (2.9)–(2.13), we are thus led to the system of second order implicit ODEs
(2.15)

rV (x) = H(x, V ′(x), p(x)) +
σ2x2
2
· V ′′(x),
(r + λ+ v(x))p(x) − (r + λ) = Hξ(x, V ′(x), p(x)) · p′(x) + (σx)
2
2
· p′′(x),
v(x) = argmin
v≥0
{c(v) − vxV ′},
with the boundary conditions
(2.16) V (0) = 0, V (x∗) = B and p(0) = 1, p(x∗) = θ(x∗) .
In the next section, an optimal feedback solution to the problem of optimal debt man-
agement (2.1)–(2.4) will be obtained by solving the above system of ODEs for the value
function V (·) and for the discounted bond price p(·).
We close this section by collecting some useful properties of the Hamiltonian function.
As in [5], the followings holds:
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Lemma 2.3. Let the assumptions (A1)-(A2) hold. Then
(1) for all ξ ≥ 0 and p ∈ [0, 1], the function H in (2.8) satisfies(
(λ+ r)x− 1
p
+ (σ2 − λ− µ− v(x))x
)
· ξ ≤ H(x, ξ, p) ≤
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
xξ,
(λ+ r)x− 1
p
+ (σ2 − λ− µ− v(x))x ≤ Hξ(x, ξ, p) ≤
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x;
(2) for every x, p > 0 the map ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p) is concave down and satisfies
H(x, 0, p) = 0,
Hξ(x, 0, p) =
(
λ+ r
p
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x;
Lemma 2.4. Let the assumptions (A1)-(A2) hold. Given x1 ∈ (0, x∗], p1 ∈ (0, 1], there
exists a constant C = C(x1, p1) such that
|F−(x, η1, p) ≤ F−(x, η2, p)| ≤ C · |η1 − η2|1/2,
for all x ∈ [x1, x∗], p ∈ [p1, 1], 0 < η1, η2 ≤ 1rHmax(x, p).
Proof. We distinguish two cases:
(1) if 0 ≤ xξ < min{xpL′(0), c′(0)}, since u∗ = v∗ = 0, we have
ξ = F−(x, η, p) =
prη
(λ+ r − p(λ+ µ))x,
and so
|F−(x, η1, p)− F−(x, η2, p)| ≤ pr
(λ+ r − p(λ+ µ))x |η1 − η2|
≤
√
2Br
(r − µ)x1 |η1 − η2|
1/2.
for all x ∈ [x1, x∗], p ∈ [p1, 1], 0 < η1, η2 ≤ 1rHmax(x, p).
(2) If xξ > min{xpL′(0), c′(0)}, we have instead
Hξξ(x, ξ, p) ≤ −1
p
min
{
1
pL′′(u∗(x, ξ, p))
,
x2p
c′′(v∗(x, ξ))
}
,
thus, recalling that by assumption we have L′′(u) ≥ δ0 and c′′(v) ≥ δ0 for 0 < u < 1
and v ≥ 0, we obtain
−Hξξ(x, ξ, p) ≥ min{1, x
2
1p1}
δ0
.
We recall this general fact: assume that f : I → R is a C2 convex strictly increasing
function defined on a real interval I, and satisfying f ′′ ≥ δ > 0. Then, denoted by
g its inverse function, g : f(I)→ I, we have that g is 1/2-Hölder continuous.
Indeed, let x1, x2 ∈ f−1(I) with x1 ≤ x2, and set y1 = g(x1) and y2 = g(x2).
f(y2)− f(y1) =
∫ y2
y1
f ′(t) dt =
∫ y2
y1
[f ′(t)− f ′(y1)] dt
= f ′(y1) · (y2 − y1) +
∫ y2
y1
∫ t
y1
f ′′(s) ds dt
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≥ f ′(y1) · (y2 − y1) + δ
2
(y2 − y1)2 ≥ δ
2
(y2 − y1)2,
since f is strictly increasing, f ′′(s) ≥ δ, and y1 ≤ y2. Thus if x2 ≥ x1 we have
|g(x2)− g(x1)| ≤
√
2
δ
|x2 − x1|1/2.
By switching the roles of x2 and x1, the same holds true if x1 ≥ x2.
In our case, set f(·) = −1rH(x, ·, p), we have
|F−(x, η1, p)− F−(x, η2, p)| ≤
√
2rδ0
min{1, x21p1}
|η2 − η1|1/2.
To conclude the proof is enough to choose
C(x1, p1)
.
=
√
2rδ0
min{1, x21p1}
+
√
2Br
(r − µ)x1 .
3. Stochastic optimal feedback solutions
3.1. Existence of optimal feedback solutions. In this subsection, we prove the exis-
tence of an optimal feedback solution to the problem of optimal debt management (2.1)–
(2.4) for a given bankruptcy threshold x∗. It is well-known (see Theorem 4.1, p.149, in [9]
or Theorem 11.2.2, p. 141, in [13]) that if (V, p) is a solution to the boundary value problem
(2.15)-(2.16), then a standard result in the theory of stochastic optimization implies that
the feedback control (u∗(·), v∗(·)) in (2.10) is optimal for the problem (2.3) with dynamics
(2.1).
Let x∗ > 0 be given. We shall construct a solution of (2.15)-(2.16) by considering the
auxiliary parabolic system
(3.1)

Vt(t, x) = −rV (t, x) +H(x, Vx(t, x), p(t, x)) + σ
2x2
2
· Vxx(t, x),
pt(t, x) = (r + λ)− (r + λ+ v(x, Vx(t, x)))p(t, x)+
+Hξ(x, Vx(t, x), p(t, x)) · px(t, x) + (σx)
2
2
· pxx(t, x),
v(x, Vx) = argmin
w≥0
{c(w) − wxVx},
with the boundary conditions
(3.2)

V (t, 0) = 0,
V (t, x∗) = B,

p(t, 0) = 1,
p(t, x∗) = θ(x∗).
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In particular, we have
(3.3) v(x, Vx) =

0, if xVx ≤ c′(0) ,
(c′)−1 (Vx(t, x)x) , if xVx > c
′(0).
Following [2], the main idea is to construct a compact, convex set of functions (V, p) :
[0, x∗] 7→ [0, B]× [θmin, 1] for some positive constant θmin which is positively invariant for
the parabolic evolution problem. A topological technique will then yield the existence of
a steady state, i.e. a solution to (3.1)-(3.2).
Theorem 3.1. In addition to (A1)-(A2), assume that σ > 0, θ(x∗) > 0 and
(3.4) lim
v→vmax
c(v) = +∞ for some vmax > 0 .
Then there exists a positive constant θmin such that the system of second order ODEs (2.15)
with boundary conditions (3.2) admits a solution (V, p) : [0, x∗]→ ×[0, B]×[θmin, 1] of class
C2. Moreover, the function V is monotone increasing and
(3.5) v(x) = argmin
w≥0
{c(w) − wxV ′} = 0 for all x ∈
[
0, x0
.
=
c′(0)
M∗
]
for some M∗ > 0.
As a consequence, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 3.2. Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 3.1, the debt management
problem (2.3) with dynamics (2.1) admits an optimal feedback solution.
Proof. The proof follows the same line of the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [5]. It is divided into
several steps:
1. Let’s introduce the following functions
v˜(x, ξ) =

0, if ξx ≤ c′(0) ,
(c′)−1 (ξx) , if ξx > c′(0) .
From (A1)-(A2) and (3.4), one has that
(3.6) v˜(x, ξ) ≤ vmax, |v˜x(x, ξ)| ≤ 1
δ0
· |ξ| and |vξ(x, ξ)| ≤ 1
δ0
· |x|
for all (x, ξ) ∈ [0,+∞)× R.
For any 0 < ε <
r − µ
λ+ µ
, consider the parabolic system
(3.7)

Vt = −rV +H(x, Vx, p + ε) +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
Vxx,
pt = (r + λ)− (r + λ+ v˜(x, Vx))p+Hξ(x, Vx, p + ε)px +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
pxx,
together with the boundary conditions (3.2), which is obtained from (3.1) by adding
the terms εVxx, εpxx on the right hand sides. For any ε > 0 this makes the system
uniformly parabolic also in a neighborhood of x = 0.
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2. Recalling Theorem 1 in [2], the system (3.7), coupled with the initial conditions
(3.8) V (0, x) = V0(x) and p(0, x) = p0(x),
admits a unique solution. Let t 7→ (V (t, ·), p(t, ·)) = St(V0, p0) be the solution of the
system (3.7), with initial data (3.7). Consider the closed, convex set of functions
D = {(V, p) : [0, x∗]→ [0, B]× [θmin, 1] : (V, p) ∈ C2, and (2.16) holds} ,
where the constant
(3.9) θmin
.
= min
{
θ(x∗),
r + λ
r + λ+ vmax
}
.
We claim that the above domain is positively invariant under the semigroup St, namely
St(D) ⊆ D, for all t ≥ 0.
Let us now consider the constant functions
V +(t, x) = B,
V −(t, x) = 0,

p+(t, x) = 1,
p−(t, x) = θmin .
Recalling Lemma 2.3 (2), we have
H(x, V +x , p+ ε) = H(x, V
−
x , p + ε) = H(x, 0, p + ε) = 0 .
As in [5], one can easily to check that V + is a supersolution and V − is a subsolution
of the first scalar parabolic equation in (3.7). Moreover, p+ is a supersolution and p−
is a subsolution of the second scalar parabolic equation in (3.7). Therefore, for any
functions V0, p0 in (3.8) take values in the box [0, B] × [θmin, 1], then for every t ≥ 0
the solution of the system (3.7) will satisfy
0 ≤ V (t, x) ≤ B, θmin ≤ p(t, x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ [0, x∗],
3. Thanks to the bounds of Lemma 2.3 (1) and (3.6) we can now apply Theorem 3 in [2]
and obtain the existence of a steady state (Vε, pε) ∈ D for the system (3.7).
(3.10)

−rV +H(x, V ′, p+ ε) +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
V ′′ = 0 ,
(r + λ)− (r + λ+ v(x))p +Hξ(x, V ′, p + ε)p′ +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
p′′ = 0 ,
with
(3.11) v(x)
.
= v˜(x, V ′(x)) =

0, if V ′(x)x ≤ c′(0)
(c′)−1 (V ′(x)x) , if V ′(x)x > c′(0),
We show that Vε is monotone increasing. Since Vε(0) = 0, Vε(x
∗) = B and Vε(x) ∈
[0, B] for all x ∈ [0, B], it holds
V ′ε(0
+) ≥ 0 and V ′ε (x∗−) ≥ 0.
Assume by a contradiction that V ε is not monotone increasing. Then there exists
x0 ∈ (0, x∗) such that
V ′ε (x0) < 0 and V
′′
ε (x0) = 0.
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This implies that
H(x0, V
′
ε (x0), p
ε(x0) + ε) = rV
ε(x0) ≥ 0.
Since 0 < ε <
r − µ
λ+ µ
and p(x0) ≤ 0, it holds
λ+ r
pε(x0) + ε
− λ+ σ2 − µ ≥ λ+ r
1 + ε
− λ+ σ2 − µ = r − µ− (λ+ µ)ε
1 + ε
+ σ2 > 0 .
Thus, (2.8) yields
H(x0, V
′
ε (x0), pε(x0) + ε) =
(
λ+ r
pε(x0) + ε
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
x0 V
′
ε(x0)
and it yields a contradiction.
4. It now remains to derive a priori estimate on this stationary solution, which will allow to
take the limit as ε→ 0. Let us first provide upper bounds for ‖V ′ε‖L∞(]0,x∗[). Observing
that for any p ∈ [0, 1], it holds
H(x, p+ ε, ξ) ≤ min
u∈[0,1]
{
L(u)− u
p+ ε
ξ
}
+
(
λ+ r
p+ ε
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
xξ
≤ 2(λ+ r + σ
2)x− 1
2p+ 2ε
· ξ + L
(
1
2
)
for all x ∈ [0, x∗], ξ ≥ 0 .
In particular, this implies that for any p ∈ [0, θmin]
(3.12) H(x, p+ ε, ξ) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, x¯1], ξ ≥M1
where x¯1
.
= min
{
1
4(λ+ r + σ2)
,
x∗
2
}
and M1
.
= 4L
(
1
2
)
.
Denote by
x¯
.
= argmax
x∈[0,x∗]
V ′ε(x).
Assume that V ′ε(x¯) ≥M1. Then (3.12) implies that x¯ ≥ x¯1. Otherwise, one has that
V ′′ε (x¯) ≥ 0 and H(x¯, pε(x¯) + ε, V ′ε (x¯)) < 0 ,
and it yields a contradiction to the first equation in (3.10).
On the other hand, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a point xˆ ∈ [x¯1, x∗]
where
(3.13) V ′(xˆ) =
V (x∗)− V (x¯1)
x∗ − x¯1 ≤
2B
x∗
.
Recalling Lemma 2.3, we obtain
|V ′′ε (x)| ≤
[
1 + r + λ+ µ+ σ2 + vmax
θmin
]
· x∗ · |V ′ε(x)|+
2rB
σ2x¯21
for all x ∈ [x¯, x∗] .
By Gronwall’s inequalities, from the above differential inequality and the estimate
(3.13), one obtains a uniform bound on V ′(x), for all x ∈ [x¯1, xˆ] ∪ [x¯1, x∗]. There-
fore,
(3.14) |V ′ε (x)| ≤ M∗ for all x ∈]0, x∗[
for some M∗ which does not depend on ε. As a consequence, (3.11) implies that
(3.15) 0 ≤ vε(x) .= v˜(x, V ′ε (x)) ≤ (c′)−1 (M∗x∗) for all x ∈ [0, x∗] .
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and
(3.16) vε(x) = 0 for all x ∈
[
0, x¯0
.
=
c′(0)
M∗
]
.
5. For any fixed 0 < δ < x∗, we first provide uniform bounds on ‖V ′′ε ‖L∞([δ,x∗[), ‖p′ε‖L∞([δ,x∗[)
and ‖p′′ε‖L∞([δ,x∗[). From Lemma 2.3 (1), we get∣∣H(x, V ′(x), p(x))∣∣ ≤ K1 .= 1 + λ+ r + µ+ σ2 + (c′)−1 (M∗x∗)
θmin
·M∗x∗,
and ∣∣Hξ(x, V ′(x), p(x))∣∣ ≤ K2 .= 1 + r + λ+ µ+ σ2 + (c′)−1 (M∗x∗)
θmin
· x∗,
for all x ∈ [0, x∗]. Thus, the first equation in (3.10) yields
(3.17) ‖V ′′ε ‖L∞([δ,x∗[) ≤ C˜1,δ .=
2rB + 2K1
σ2δ2
.
Moreover, the second equation in (3.10) implies that
(3.18)
∣∣p′′ε(x)∣∣ ≤ K2σ2δ2 · ∣∣p′ε(x)∣∣+ r + λ+ (c′)−1 (M∗x∗)σ2δ2 for all x ∈ [δ, x∗) .
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a point xˆ ∈ [δ, x∗] such that
|p′ε(xˆ)| =
∣∣∣pε(x∗)− pε(δ)
x∗ − δ
∣∣∣ ≤ 1
x∗ − δ .
From (3.18), the Gronwall’s lemma yields
(3.19) ‖p′ε‖L∞([δ,x∗[) ≤ C˜2,δ and ‖p′′ε‖L∞([δ,x∗[) ≤ C˜3,δ
for some constants C˜2,δ, C˜3,δ, uniformly valid as ε→ 0+.
On the other hand, recalling (2.8), (2.10), (2.13) and (3.14), we obtain that H and
Hξ are uniformly Lipschitz on [δ, x
∗]× [0,M∗]× [θmin, 1]. Hence, the functions
(Vε)
′′ =
2
2ε+ σ2x2
· [rVε −H(x, (Vε)′, pε + ε)]
and
(pε)
′′ =
2
2ε+ σ2x2
· [(r + λ) · (pε − 1)−Hξ(x, (Vε)′, pε + ε)p′ε]
are also uniformly bounded and uniformly Lipschitz on [δ, x∗].
6. By choosing a suitable subsequence, we achieve the uniform convergence (Vε, pε) →
(V, p) on C2(]δ, x∗[) for all δ > 0, where V, p are twice continuously differentiable and
solves the system of ODEs (2.15) on the open interval ]0, x∗[. Moreover, recalling
(3.14),(3.17) and (3.19), it holds
lim
x→x∗−
V (x) = B, lim
x→x∗−
p(x) = 0 and lim
x→0+
V (x) = 0 .
In order to show that limx→0+ p(x) = 1, one needs to provide a lower bound on pε in a
neighborhood of x = 0, independent of ε. Let’s introduce the constant
γ
.
= min
{
1 , (r + λ)
(
λ+ r
θmin
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)−1}
.
Then define
p−(x)
.
= 1− cxγ ,
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choosing c > 0 so that p−(x¯0) = θmin where x¯0 is in (3.16). We prove that p
− is a lower
solution of the second equation of (3.10) in the interval [0, x¯0]. Indeed, by (3.10), (3.16)
and (2.13), one estimates
(r + λ)− (r + λ+ v(x))p +Hξ(x, V ′, p)p′ +
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
p′′
= (r + λ)cxγ −Hξ(x, V ′, p) cγxγ−1 − c
(
ε+
(σx)2
2
)
γ(1 − γ)xγ−2
≥ (r + λ)cxγ −Hξ(x, V ′, p) cγxγ−1
=
[
(r + γ)−
(
λ+ r
θmin
− λ+ σ2 − µ
)
γ
]
cxγ
for all x ∈]0, x¯0]. This implies that
pε(x) ≥ 1− cxγ for all x ∈ [0, x¯0]
and it yields lim
x→0+
p(x) = 0.
3.2. Dependence on the bankruptcy threshold x∗. In this subsection, we will study
the behavior of the expected total cost for servicing when the maximum size x∗ of the debt,
at which bankruptcy is declared, becomes very large. More precisely, for a given x∗, let
p(·, x∗) be a solution to the system of second order ODEs (2.15) with boundary conditions
(3.2). We investigate whether, as x∗ →∞, the value function V (·, x∗) remains positive or
approaches zero uniformly on bounded sets.
Theorem 3.3. Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 3.1, the followings hold:
(i) if lim inf
s→+∞
θ(s)s = +∞ then
(3.20) lim
x∗→∞
V (x, x∗) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x∗[
(ii) if lim sup
s→+∞
θ(s)s = C1 < +∞ then
(3.21) lim inf
x∗→∞
V (x, x∗) ≥ r(1 + (r − µ)C1)
(r + 2vmax)(1 + (r − µ)(C1 + 1)) −
1 + C1(r − µ)
(r − µ)x
for all x ≥ (r + 2vmax) · [1 + (1 + C1)(r − µ)]
r(r − µ) .
Proof. 1. Fixed x∗, let p(x, x∗) and V (x,∗ ) be the solution to (2.15) with boundary
conditions (3.2). Denote by
v(x,∗ )
.
= argmin
ω≥0
{c(ω)− ωxV ′(x, x∗)}
With the same argument in steps 2-5 in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we obtain that
(p(x, x∗), V (x,∗ )) ∈ [θmin, θ(x∗)]× [0, B],
and V (·, x∗) is increasing. Moreover, there exists M∗ > 0 depending on x∗ such that
V ′(x, x∗) ≤M∗ for all x ∈ [x, x∗] and
(3.22) v(x, x∗)
.
= 0 for all x ∈
[
0, x¯0
.
=
c′(0)
M∗
]
.
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We will construct upper and lower bounds for V (·, x∗), p(·, x∗), in the form
(3.23) V2(x) ≤ V (x, x∗) ≤ V1(x), p1(x) ≤ p(x, x∗) ≤ p2(x),
where
• for any V (·, ·) with Vx ≥ 0, the functions p1(·) and p2(·) are a subsolution and a
supersolution of the second equation in (2.15), respectively.
• for any p(·, ·) with p ∈ [0, 1] and px ≤ 0, the function V1(·) and V2(·) are a super-
solution and a subsolution of the first equation in (2.15), respectively.
Toward this goal, we introduce the constants
(3.24) γ
.
=
r + λ
r + λ+ vmax
and β
.
= r + λ+ vmax .
2. Let us prove (i). Suppose that
lim sup
s→+∞
θ(s)s = +∞ .
Fix x∗ > 0, let us construct a suitable pair of functions V1, p1. Two cases are considered:
• If θ(x∗) ≥ γ then let V1(·) be the solution to the backward Cauchy problem
rV1(x) =
(
β + σ2
)
xV ′1(x), V1(x
∗) = B .
Solving the above ODE, we obtain that
V1(x) = B ·
( x
x∗
) r
β+σ2 for all x ∈ [0, x∗] .
A direct computation yields
V ′(x) > 0 and V ′′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (0, x∗) .
Thus, from (2.3) (1), it holds for all q ≥ γ that
−rV1 +H(x, V ′1 , q) +
σ2x2
2
· V ′′1 ≤ −rV1 +
(
r + λ
γ
+ σ2
)
xV ′1
= −rV1 +
(
β + σ2
)
xV ′1 = 0 .
From Theorem 3.1, it holds
p(x, x∗) ≥ θmin = min
{
θ(x∗),
r + λ
r + λ+ vmax
}
= γ.
This implies that
−rV1 +H(x, V ′1 , p1(x, x∗)) +
σ2x2
2
· V ′′1 ≤ 0 .
and thus V1 is a super-solution of the first equation in (2.15). A standard compar-
ison arguments yields
(3.25) V (x, x∗) ≤ V1(x) ≤ B ·
( x
x∗
) r
β+σ2 for all x ∈ [0, x∗] .
• If θ(x∗) < γ then let (p˜1, V˜1) be the solution to the backward Cauchy problem
(3.26)

rV˜1(x) =
(λ+ r
p˜1
+ σ2
)
xV˜ ′1 ,
β · (p˜1 − γ) =
(λ+ r
p˜1
+ σ2
)
xp˜′1 ,

V˜1(x
∗) = B,
p˜1(x
∗) = θ(x∗).
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This solution satisfies that p1 is strictly decreasing,
(3.27) p˜1(x) =
θ(x∗)x∗
x
·
(
γ − p˜1(x)
γ − θ(x∗)
)1+σ2
β
, lim
x→0+
p˜1(x) = γ
and V˜1 is increasing
V˜1(x) = B ·
(
p˜1(x) · x
θ(x∗) · x∗
) r
β+σ2
for all x ∈ [0, x∗] .
Using (3.26) and (3.27) one obtains
−1 = p˜′1(x) ·
[
x
p˜1(x)
+
(
1 +
σ2
β
)
· x
γ − p˜1(x)
]
= p˜′1(x) ·
 x
p˜1(x)
+
(
1 +
σ2
β
)
·
 [θ(x∗)x∗] ββ+σ2
γ − θ(x∗)
 · x σ2β+σ2
p˜1(x)
β
β+σ2
 .
Since, p˜1 is strictly decreasing, we then obtain that p˜
′′
1(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, x∗)
and thus
β · (γ − p˜1) +
(
λ+ r
p˜1
+ σ2
)
xp˜′1 +
σ2x2
2
p˜′′1 > 0 .
Thus, from Lemma 2.3 (1), it holds
(3.28) (r + λ)− (r + λ+ v(x))p˜1(x) +Hξ(x, V ′(x, x∗), p˜1)xp′1 +
σ2x2
2
p˜′′1 > 0
for all x ∈ (0, x).
On the other hand, recalling x¯0 =
c′(0)
M∗
in (3.22), let p¯1 be the solution of the
backward Cauchy problem
(r + λ)(p¯1 − 1) =
(
λ+ r
p¯1
+ σ2
)
xp¯′1, p¯1(x¯0) = p˜1(x¯0) .
As in the previous step, one obtains that p¯1 is decreasing, limx→0+ p¯1(x) = 1 and
p¯1(x) =
p˜1(x¯0)x¯0
x
·
(
1− p¯1(x)
1− p¯1(x¯0)
)σ2+λ+r
λ+r
for all x ∈ [0, x¯0] .
Moreover, p¯′′1(x) > 0 and
(3.29) (r + λ)(1 − p¯1) +Hξ(x, V ′(x, x∗), p¯1)p¯′1 +
σ2x2
2
p¯′′1 > 0 for all x ∈ (0, x¯0).
Let us define
(3.30) p1(x) =

p¯1(x) for all x ∈ [0, x¯0] ,
p˜1(x) for all x ∈ [x¯0, x∗] .
One has that
p1(0) = p(0, x
∗) = 1 and p1(x
∗) = p(x∗, x∗) = θ(x∗) .
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Recalling that v(x, x∗) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x0], (3.28) and (3.29) implies that
(r + λ)− (v + λ+ v(x))p1(x) +Hξ(x, V ′(x, x∗), p1)p′1 +
σ2x2
2
p′′1 > 0
for all x ∈ (0, x0) ∪ (x0, x∗). Thus, p1 is a sub-solution of the second equation in
(2.15). A standard comparison arguments yields
(3.31) p(x, x∗) ≤ p1(x) for all x ∈ [0, x∗] .
Next, differentiating both sides of the first ODE in (3.26), we obtain(
r − σ2 − λ+ r
p˜1
+
(λ+ r)p˜′1
p˜21
x
)
· V˜ ′1 =
(
λ+ r
p˜1
+ σ2
)
xV˜ ′′1
for all x ∈]0, x∗[. This implies
V˜ ′′1 (x) < 0 for all x ∈ ]0, x∗[ ,
and Lemma 2.3 (1) yields
(3.32) − rV˜ ′1(x) +H(x, V˜ ′1(x), p˜1(x)) +
σ2x2
2
V˜ ′′1 (x) < 0 for all x ∈ (0, x∗) .
From (2.14), the map p 7→ H(x, ξ, p) is monotone decreasing when ξ ≥ 0 and
x ≥ 1λ+r . Set x¯1
.
= min
{
1
r + λ
, x¯0
}
, we define
V1(x)
.
=

V˜ (x¯1) for x ∈ [0, x¯1],
V˜ (x) for x ∈ [x¯1, x∗] ,
For any x ∈ (0, x¯1), it holds
−rV1(x) +H(x, V ′1(x), p1(x)) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′1 (x) = −rV˜1(x1) < 0 .
For any x ∈ (x¯1, x∗), from (3.32) and (3.31), one gets
− rV1(x) +H(x, V ′1(x), p(x, x∗)) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′1 (x)
< rV1(x) +H(x, V
′
1(x), p(x, x
∗)) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′1 (x) ≤ 0 .
Hence, V1(x) is a super-solution of the first equation in (2.15). A standard com-
parison arguments yields
(3.33) V (x, x∗) ≤ V1(x) ≤ B ·
(
p˜1(x) · x
θ(x∗) · x∗
) r
β+σ2
for all x ∈ [x¯1, x∗]
From (3.25) and (3.33), we finally obtain that
V (x, x∗) ≤ B ·
(
x
θ(x∗)x∗
) r
β+σ2
for all x ∈ [x¯1, x∗]
and it yields (3.20).
3. Let us prove (ii). Suppose that
lim sup
s→+∞
θ(s)s = C1 < +∞ .
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Set x¯2
.
=
1
r − µ + θ(x
∗)x∗, we define
p˜2(x) =

1 for x ∈ [0, x¯2],
x¯2
x
=
(
1
r − µ + θ(x
∗)x∗
)
· 1
x
for x ∈ [x¯2, x∗] .
One has that
p2(0) = 1 = p(0, x
∗), p2(x
∗) =
r − µ
x∗
+ θ(x∗) > p(x,∗ )
and
p˜′2(x) = −
p˜2(x)
x
, p˜′′2(x) =
2p˜2(x)
x2
.
For x ∈ (0, x¯2), it holds
(r + λ)− (r + λ+ v(x, x∗))p˜2(x) +Hξ(x, V ′(x, x∗), p˜1(x)) · p˜′1(x) +
σ2x2
2
p˜′′2(x)
= −v(x, x∗)p2(x) < 0 .
On the other hand, recalling (2.13), we get
(r + λ)− (r + λ+ v(x, x∗))p˜2(x) +Hξ(x, V ′(x, x∗), p˜1(x)) · p˜′1(x) +
σ2x2
2
p˜′′2(x)
=
u∗(V ′(x,∗ ), p˜(x))
x
− (r − µ) · p˜2(x) ≤ 1
x
− (r − µ) · p˜2(x) < 0
for all x ∈ (x¯2, x∗). Therefore, p2(·) is a super-solution of the first equation in (2.15) and
(3.34) p(x, x∗) ≤ p2(x) for all x ∈ [0, x∗] .
Next, set
(3.35) x¯3
.
=
(
1 +
2vmax
r
)
· (1 + x¯2) ≥ 1
r + λ
.
For x∗ ≥ x¯3, we define
V2(x) =

0 for x ∈ [0, x¯3],[
x¯2
x¯3
− p2(x)
]
·B for x ∈ [x¯3, x∗] .
For every x ∈ (0, x¯3), V2(x) = 0 and
(3.36) − rV2 +H(x, V ′2 , p(x, x∗)) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2 = H(x, 0, p(x, x
∗)) = 0 .
For every x ∈ (x¯2, x∗), we have
V ′2(x) = B ·
p2(x)
x
> 0, V ′′2 (x) = −2B ·
p2(x)
x2
< 0 .
Recalling (3.35), we estimate
−rV2 +H(x, V ′2 , p2) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2
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≥ −rV2 +
( (λ+ r)x− 1
p2
+ (σ2 − λ− µ− vmax)x
)
V ′2 +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2
≥ B ·
[
rp2 − r
2
+
(
λ+ r − 1
x
+ (σ2 − λ− µ− vmax)p2(x)
)
− σ2p2
]
= B ·
(
λ+
r
2
− 1
x
− (λ+ µ− r − vmax)p2
)
= B ·
[
λ(1− p2(x)) + (r − µ)p2(x) + r
2
− 1
x
− p2vmax
]
> B ·
[
r
2
− p2vmax − 1
x
]
> B ·
[
r
2
− x¯2vmax + 1
x
]
≥ rx¯3 − 2(x¯2vmax + 1)
2x
> 0 .
From (3.35), it holds
(λ+ r)x > 1 for all x ∈ [x¯3, x∗] .
Hence the map p → H(x, V ′2(x), p) is monotone decreasing on [0, 1], for all x ∈ [x¯3, x∗].
Recalling (3.34), we get
−rV2 +H(x, V ′2 , p(x, x∗)) +
σ2x2
2
V ′′2 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ (x¯3, x∗) .
Since V2(0) = V (x, x
∗) and V2(x
∗) < B = V (x,∗ ), together with (3.36), the function V2 is
a sub-solution of the first equation in (2.15) and
(3.37) V (x, x∗) ≥ V2(x) ≥ Bx¯2 ·
[
1
x¯3
− 1
x
]
=
[
1
r − µ + θ(x
∗)x∗
]
· 1
x
.
Letting x∗ to +∞, we obtain (3.21).
4. The deterministic case σ = 0
In the case σ = 0, the stochastic control system (2.1) reduces to the deterministic one
(4.1) x˙(t) =
(
λ+ r
p(t)
− λ− µ− v(t)
)
x(t)− u(t)
p(t)
.
Here the control u(t) is assumed to be in [0, 1] for all t ≥ 0.
Throughout the paper, we always assume r > µ. The deterministic Debt Management
Problem can be formulated as follows.
(DMP) Given an initial value x(0) = x0 ∈ [0, x∗] of the DTI, minimize
(4.2)
∫ Tb
0
e−rt[L(u(t)) + c(v(t))] dt + e−rTbB,
subject to the dynamics (4.1), where the bankruptcy time Tb is defined as in (2.2),
while the discount bond price
(4.3) p(t) =
∫ Tb
t
(r + λ) exp
{
−
∫ s
0
(
λ+ r + v(τ)
)
dτ
}
ds+
+ exp
{
−
∫ Tb
t
(r + λ+ v(s)) ds
}
θ(x∗).
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Since in this case the optimal feedback control u∗, v∗ and the corresponding functions V ∗, p∗
may not be smooth, a concept of equilibrium solution should be more carefully defined.
Definition 4.1 (Equilibrium solution in feedback form). A couple of piecewise Lip-
schitz continuous functions (u∗(·), v∗(·)) and p∗(·) provide an equilibrium solution to the
debt management problem (DMP), with continuous value function V ∗(·), if
(i) For every x0 ∈ [0, x∗], V ∗ is the minimum cost for the optimal control problem
(4.4) minimize:
∫ Tb
0
e−rt[L(u(x(t))) + c(v(x(t)))] dt + e−rTbB,
subject to
(4.5) x˙(t) =
(
λ+ r
p∗(x(t))
− λ− µ− v(t)
)
x(t)− u(t)
p∗(x(t))
, x(0) = x0.
Moreover, every Carathéodory solution of (4.5) with (u(t), v(t)) = (u∗(x(t)), v∗(x(t)))
is optimal.
(ii) For every x0 ∈ [0, x∗], there exists at least one solution t 7→ x(t) of the Cauchy
problem
(4.6) x˙(t) =
(
λ+ r
p∗(x)
− λ− µ− v∗(x(t))
)
x− u
∗(x)
p∗(x)
, x(0) = x0,
such that
(4.7) p∗(x0) =
∫ Tb
0
(r + λ) exp
{
−
∫ t
0
(
λ+ r + v∗(x(s)
)
ds
}
dt+
+ exp
{
−
∫ Tb
0
(r + λ+ v∗(x(t))) dt
}
θ(x∗),
with Tb as in (2.2).
In the deterministic case, (2.15) becomes the following implicit system of the first order
ODEs
(4.8)

rV (x ) = H(x, V ′(x), p(x)) ,
(r + λ+ v(x))p(x) − (r + λ) = Hξ(x, V ′(x), p(x)) · p′(x) ,
v(x) = argmin
ω≥0
{c(ω) − ωxV ′(x)} ,
with the boundary conditions
(4.9)

V (0) = 0,
V (x∗) = B,

p(0) = 1,
p(x∗) = θ(x∗).
The Hamiltonian function (2.8) reduces to
(4.10) H(x, ξ, p)
.
= min
u∈[0,1]
{
L(u)− u ξ
p
}
+ min
v≥0
{
c(v) − vxξ
}
+
(
λ+ r
p
− λ− µ
)
x ξ.
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For further use, we compute the gradient of the Hamiltonian function H(·)
(4.11)

Hx(x, ξ, p) =
[
(λ+ r)− p(λ+ µ+ v∗(x, ξ))
]
· ξ
p
,
Hξ(x, ξ, p) =
1
p
·
[
x
(
(λ+ r)− p(λ+ µ+ v∗(x, ξ))) − u∗(x, ξ, p)],
Hp(x, ξ, p) = (u
∗(x, ξ, p)− x(λ+ r)) · ξ
p2
,
where for x > 0 and p ∈]0, 1] we have
u∗(x, ξ, p)
.
= argmin
u∈[0,1]
{
L(u)− u ξ
p
}
=
{
0, if 0 ≤ ξ < pL′(0),
(L′)−1(ξ/p), if ξ ≥ pL′(0) > 0,
v∗(x, ξ)
.
= argmin
v≥0
{
c(v) − vxξ
}
=
{
0, if 0 ≤ xξ < c′(0),
(c′)−1(xξ), if xξ ≥ c′(0) > 0.
The following Lemma will catch some relevant properties of H(·) needed to study the
system (4.8).
Lemma 4.2. Let x ≥ 0 and 0 < p ≤ 1 be fixed, and set
Hmax(x, p)
.
= max
ξ≥0
H(x, ξ, p).
Then
(1) there exists ξ♯(x, p) > 0 such that, given η > 0, the equation rη = H(x, ξ, p)
• admits no solutions ξ ∈ [0,+∞) if rη > Hmax(x, p),
• admits as unique solution ξ♯(x, p) if rη = Hmax(x, p),
• admits exactly two distinct solutions {F−(x, η, p), F+(x, η, p)} with
0 < F−(x, η, p) < ξ♯(x, p) < F+(x, η, p)
if 0 < rη < Hmax(x, p),
(2) we extend the definition of η 7→ F±(x, η, p) by setting
F−(x,Hmax(x, p), p) = F+(x,Hmax(x, p), p) = ξ♯(x, p),
thus for fixed x > 0 , p ∈]0, 1], the maps η 7→ F−(x, η, p) and η 7→ F+(x, η, p) are
respectively striclty increasing and strictly decreasing in [0,Hmax(x, p)].
(3) for all 0 < η < Hmax(x, p) with x > 0 and p ∈]0, 1], we have
∂
∂η
F±(x, η, p) =
r
Hξ(x, F±(x, η, p), p)
,
(4) The map p 7→ Hmax(x, p) is strictly decreasing on ]0, 1] for every fixed x ∈]0, x∗[.
Proof. Since for all fixed x > 0, 0 < p ≤ 1 we have that ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p) is the minimum
of a family of affine functions of ξ, we have that the map ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p) is concave down.
For all x > 0, 0 < p ≤ 1 we have
∇ u∗(x, ξ, p) = (0, 1,−L
′(u∗(x, ξ, p)))
pL′′(u∗(x, ξ, p))
, if ξ > pL′(0),(4.12)
∇ v∗(x, ξ) = (ξ, x, 0)
c′′(v∗(x, ξ))
, if xξ > c′(0),
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lim
ξ→+∞
v∗(x, ξ) = +∞,
Recalling (4.11), since
• Hξ(x, ξ, p) = Hξ(x, 0, p) > 0, for all ξ ∈ [0,min{pL′(0), c′(0)/x}],
• ξ 7→ Hξ(x, ξ, p), is strictly decreasing for all ξ > min{pL′(0), c′(0)/x},
• lim
ξ→+∞
Hξ(x, ξ, p) = −∞,
we have that ξ 7→ Hξ(x, ξ, p) vanishes in at most one point in [0,+∞), so ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p)
reaches its maximum value Hmax(x, p) on [0,+∞) at a unique point ξ♯(x, p), moreover
it is strictly increasing for 0 < ξ < ξ♯(x, p) and strictly decreasing for ξ > ξ♯(x, p). We
define the strictly increasing map η 7→ F−(x, η, p), for 0 < η < Hmax(x, p), to be the
inverse of ξ 7→ 1rH(x, ξ, p) for 0 < ξ < ξ♯. Similarly, we define the strictly decreasing
map η 7→ F+(x, η, p), for 0 < η < Hmax(x, p), to be the inverse of ξ 7→ 1rH(x, ξ, p) for
ξ > ξ♯(x, p).
Set
u♯(x, p)
.
= u∗(x, ξ♯(x, p), p), v♯(x, p)
.
= v∗(x, ξ♯(x, p)) .
Recalling (4.11), we have
u♯(x, p) =
[
(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ+ v♯(x, p))p] · x,(4.13)
ξ♯(x, p) = pL′(u♯(x, p)) = pL′
([
(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ+ v♯(x, p))p] · x) ,(4.14)
Hmax(x, p) = L(u♯(x, p)) + c(v♯(x, p)).(4.15)
For any fixed x ≥ 0 and 0 < p ≤ 1, given η > 0 we consider the equation rη = H(x, ξ, p),
and all the statements follows by applying F±(x, ·, p) to it. To prove item (4), we notice
that
d
dp
Hmax(x, p) =
d
dp
H(x, ξ♯(x, p), p) = Hp(x, ξ
♯(x, p), p).
Recalling (4.11), we have
Hp(x, ξ
♯(x, p), p) =
[
u♯(x, p)− (r + λ)x
]
· ξ
♯(x, p)
p
= −(λ+ µ+ v♯(x, p))xξ♯(x, p) < 0 ,
since for x, p 6= 0 we have ξ♯(x, p) > 0.
Definition 4.3 (Normal form of the system). Given x > 0, 0 < p ≤ 1, 0 < rη ≤
Hmax(x, p) we define the maps
(4.16) G±(x, η, p) =
(r + λ+ v∗(x, F±(x, η, p), p))p − (r + λ)
Hξ(x, F±(x, η, p), p)
.
Notice that if rV (x) > Hmax(x, p), then the first equation of (4.8) has no solution. Other-
wise, if 0 < rV (x) < Hmax(x, p) this equation splits into
V ′(x) = F−(x, V (x), p(x)),
p′(x) = G−(x, V (x), p(x)),
or

V ′(x) = F+(x, V (x), p(x)),
p′(x) = G+(x, V (x), p(x)).
Remark 4.4. Recalling (4.1) and (4.13), we observe that
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F−(x, η, p) ξ♯(x, p) F+(x, η, p)O
rη
Hmax(x, p)
ξ
Figure 1. For x ≥ 0, p ∈]0, 1], the function ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p) has a unique
global maximum Hmax(x, p) attained for ξ = ξ♯(x, p). For 0 < rη ≤ Hmax,
the values F−(x, η, p) ≤ ξ♯(x, p) ≤ F+(x, η, p) are well defined.
• The value V ′(x) = F+(x, V (x), p) ≥ ξ♯(x, p) corresponds to the choice of an optimal
control such that x˙(t) < 0. The total debt-to-ratio is descreasing.
• The value V ′(x) = F−(x, V (x), p) ≤ ξ♯(x, p) corresponds to the choice of an optimal
control such that x˙(x) > 0. The total debt-to-ratio is increasing.
• When rV (x) = Hmax(x, p), then the value
V ′(x) = F+(x, V (x), p) = F−(x, V ′(x), p) = ξ♯(x, p)
corresponds to the unique control strategy such that x˙(t) = 0.
Remark 4.5. We notice that if 0 ≤ xξ < min{xpL′(0), c′(0)}, since u∗ = v∗ = 0, we have
ξ = F−(x, η, p) =
prη
(λ+ r − p(λ+ µ))x,
in particular, if 0 ≤ xξ < min{xpL′(0), c′(0)} we have that η 7→ F−(x, η, p) is Lipschitz
continuous, uniformly for (x, p) ∈ [x1, x∗] × [p1, 1], for all x1 ∈ (0, x∗], p1 ∈ (0, 1]. If
xξ > min{xpL′(0), c′(0)}, we have instead
Hξξ ≤ −1
p
min
{
1
pL′′(u∗(x, ξ, p))
,
x2p
c′′(v∗(x, ξ))
}
.
4.1. Construction of a solution. We will begin our analysis from the control strategies
keeping the DTI constant in time, i.e., such that the corresponding solution x(·) of (4.1)
is constant. In this case, there is no bankruptcy risk, i.e., Tb = +∞.
Definition 4.6 (Constant strategies). Let x¯ > 0 be given. We say that a couple (u¯, v¯) ∈
[0, 1[×[0,+∞[ is a constant strategy for x¯ if
[(
λ+ r
p¯
− λ− µ− v¯
)
x¯− u¯
p¯
]
= 0,
p¯ =
r + λ
r + λ+ v¯
,
where the second relation comes from taking Tb = +∞ in (4.3).
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From these equations, if a couple (u¯, v¯) ∈ [0, 1[×[0,+∞[ is a constant strategy then it
holds (r + λ)(r − µ)x¯ = (r + λ + v¯)u¯. In this case, the borrower will never go bankrupt
and thus the cost of this strategy in (4.2) is computed by
1
r
·
[
L(u¯) + c(v¯)
]
=
1
r
·
[
L
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x¯
r + λ+ v¯
)
+ c (v¯)
]
=
1
r
·
[
L ((r − µ)x¯ · p¯) + c
((
1− 1
p¯
)
(r + λ)
)]
.
We notice that if x¯(r − µ) > 1, we must have v¯ > 1 and p¯ < 1, in particular if DTI is
sufficiently large, every constant strategy needs to implement currency devaluation, with
a consequently drop of p. A more precise estimate will be provided in Proposition 4.9.
We are now interested in the minimum cost of a strategy keeping the debt constant. To
this aim, we first characterize the cost of a constant strategy in terms of the variables x, p.
Lemma 4.7. Given any (x, p) ∈]0,+∞[×]0, 1], we have
(4.17) Hmax(x, p) = min
{
L(u)+c(v) : u ∈ [0, 1], v ≥ 0, u = [(λ+r)−(λ+µ+v)p]·x},
Moreover, (uˆ, vˆ) realizes the minimum in the right hand side of (4.17) if and only if
c(vˆ) + pxvˆξ♯(x, p) = min
ζ≥0
{
pxξ♯(x, p)ζ + c(ζ)
}
,
L(uˆ) + uˆξ♯(x, p) = min
u∈[0,1]
{
ξ♯(x, p)u+ L(u)
}
.
Proof. Set F (v) := f(v) + g(Λv) where f(ζ) = c(ζ) for ζ ≥ 0 and f(ζ) = +∞ if ζ < 0,
C(x, p) =
[
(λ+r)−(λ+µ)p] ·x, g(ζ) = L(C(x, p)+ζ) if C(x, p)+ζ ∈ [0, 1] and g(ζ) = +∞
if C(x, p) + ζ /∈ [0, 1], and Λ = −xp. By standard argument in convex analysis (see e.g.
Theorem 4.2 and Remark 4.2 p. 60 of [7]), denoted by f∗, g∗ the convex conjugates of f, g
respectively, we have
inf
v∈R
F (v) = sup
ν∈R
[−f∗(Λν)− g∗(−ν)]
= sup
ν∈R
[
min
ζ≥0
{
c(ζ) + xpνζ
}
+ min
C(x,p)+ζ∈[0,1]
{
L(C + ζ) + νζ
}]
= sup
ν∈R
[
min
ζ≥0
{
c(ζ) + xpνζ
}
+ min
u∈[0,1]
{
L(u) + νu
}
−Cν
]
= sup
ξ∈R
[
min
ζ≥0
{
c(ζ)− xξζ
}
+ min
u∈[0,1]
{
L(u)− u · ξ
p
}
+
C(x, p)
p
· ξ
]
= sup
ξ∈R
H(x, ξ, p) = Hmax(x, p).
Moreover, since sup
ξ∈R
H(x, ξ, p) is attained only at ξ = ξ♯(x, p) according to the strict con-
cavity of ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, p), (uˆ, vˆ) realizes the minimum in the right hand side of (4.17) if and
only if 
f(vˆ) + f∗(Λξ♯(x, p)) − Λvˆξ♯(x, p) = 0,
g(Λvˆ) + g∗(−ξ♯(x, p)) + Λvˆξ♯(x, p) = 0,
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which implies vˆ ≥ 0, C(x, p)− pxvˆ ∈ [0, 1], and
c(vˆ) + pxvˆξ♯(x, p) = min
ζ≥0
{pxξ♯(x, p)ζ + c(ζ)},
L(C(x, p)− pxvˆ)− pxvˆξ♯(x, p) = min
ν∈R
{
ξ♯(x, p)ν + L(C(x, p) + ν)
}
.
The second relation can be rewritten as
L(uˆ) + uˆξ♯(x, p) = min
u∈[0,1]
{
ξ♯(x, p)u+ L(u)
}
.
Formula (4.17) allows us to give a simpler characterization of the minimum cost of a
strategy keeping the debt-to-income ratio constant in time. Indeed, given x ∈ [0, x∗], we
select (u(x), v(x)) keeping the debt-to-income ratio constant in time. This defines uniquely
a value p = p(x) by Definition 4.6 and impose a relation between u(x) and v(x). Then we
take the minimum over all the costs of such strategies, i.e., the right hand side of formula
(4.17). This naturally leads to the following definition.
Definition 4.8 (Optimal cost for constant strategies). Given x ∈ [0, x∗], we define
W (x) =
1
r
·Hmax (x, pc(x)) ,
where
(4.18)

pc(x) =
r + λ
r + λ+ vc(x)
,
vc(x) = argmin
v≥0
[
L
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ+ v
)
+ c(v)
]
.
For every x ∈ [0, x∗], W (x) denotes the minimum cost of a strategy keeping the DTI ratio
constant in time.
The next results proves that if the debt-to-income ratio is sufficiently small, the optimal
strategy keeping it constant does not use the devaluation of currency.
Proposition 4.9 (Non-devaluating regime for optimal constant strategies). Let xc ≥ 0 be
the unique solution of the following equation in x
(r + λ)c′(0) = (r − µ)xL′ ((r − µ)x) .
Then
• for all x ∈ [0,min{xc, x∗}] we have W (x) = 1
r
· L((r − µ)x) and pc(x) = 1,
• for all x ∈]min{xc, x∗}, x∗] we have
W (x) =
1
r
[
L
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ+ vc(x)
)
+ c(vc(x))
]
,
pc(x) =
r + λ
r + λ+ vc(x)
< 1,
where vc(x) > 0 solves the following equation in v
c′(v) =
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
(r + λ+ v)2
· L′
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ+ v
)
.
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• for every x ∈]0, x∗[ we have
(4.19) W ′(x) =
r − µ
r
pc(x)L
′(pc(x)(r − µ)x) < ξ♯(x, pc(x)).
Proof. Given x ∈]0, x∗[, we define the convex function
F x(v)
.
=

1
r
·
[
L
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ+ v
)
+ c(v)
]
, if v ≥ 0, (r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ+ v
∈ [0, 1],
+∞, otherwise.
We compute
d
dv
F x(v) =
1
r
·
[
c′(v)− L′
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ+ v
)
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
(r + λ+ v)2
]
,
which is monotone increasing and satisfies lim
v→+∞
d
dv
F x(v) = +∞,
d
dv
F x(v) ≥ d
dv
F x(0) =
1
r
·
[
c′(0)− L′ ((r − µ)x) (r − µ)x
r + λ
]
.
Two cases may occur:
• If d
dv
F x(0) ≥ 0, we have that v = 0 realizes the minimum of F on [0,+∞[. This
occours when x ∈ [0,min{xc, x∗}] where xc is the unique solution of
(r + λ)c′(0) = (r − µ)xL′
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ
)
,
and it implies W (x) =
1
r
· L((r − µ)x) and pc(x) = 1.
• If we have min{xc, x∗} < x ≤ x∗, then there exists a unique point vc(x) > 0 such
that F ′(vc(x)) = 0, and this point is characterized by
c′(vc(x)) =
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
(r + λ+ vc(x))2
· L′
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ+ vc(x)
)
.
The remaining statements follows noticing that for min{xc, x∗} < x ≤ x∗ we have
W ′(x) =
∂F x
∂x
(vc(x)) +
∂
∂v
F x(vc(x)) · v′c(x) =
∂F x
∂x
(vc(x))
=
r − µ
r
pc(x)L
′(pc(x)(r − µ)x),
and deriving the explicit expression of W (x) for [0,min{xc, x∗}] yields the same
formula. Notice that, by (4.14), we have
ξ♯(x, pc(x)) = pc(x)L
′
([
(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ+ v♯(x, pc(x)))pc(x)
] · x)
= pc(x)L
′
([
(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ+ v♯(x, pc(x))) · λ+ r
λ+ r + v♯(x, pc(x))
]
· x
)
= pc(x)L
′(pc(x)(r − µ) · x) > W ′(x),
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where we used the fact that L′ is strictly increasing and, since the argument of L′
must be nonnegative, we have
λ+ r
λ+ µ+ v♯(x, pc(x))
≥ pc(x).
We pass now to study the properties of the backward solution. We will construct an
equilibrium solution of 4.8 by a suitable concatenation of backward solutions.
Definition 4.10 (Backward solution for x∗). Let x 7→ (Z(x, x∗), q(x, x∗)) be the backward
solution of the system of ODEs
(4.20)

Z ′(x) = F−(x,Z(x), q(x)),
q′(x) = G−(x,Z(x), q(x)),
with

Z(x∗) = B ,
q(x∗) = θ(x∗).
with Hξ(x, F
−(x,Z(x), q(x)), q(x)) 6= 0.
The following Lemma states some basic properties of the backward solution. In par-
ticular, the backward solution Z(·, x∗), starting from B at x∗ with W (x∗) < B, survives
backward at least until the first intersection with the graph of W (·). Moreover, in this
interval is monotone increasing and positive. In the same way, q(·, x∗) is always in ]0, 1].
Proposition 4.11. [Basic properties of the backward solution] Set
x∗W :=
{
0, if Z(x, x∗) < W (x) for all x ∈]0, x∗[,
sup{x ∈]0, x∗[: Z(x, x∗) ≥W (x)}, otherwise .
Assume that
(4.21) W (x∗) > B and θ(x∗) <
r + λ
r + λ+ v∗(x∗, F−(x∗, B, θ(x∗)))
.
Denote by Ix∗ ⊆ [0, x∗] the maximal domain of the backward equation (4.20), define y(x)
to be the maximal solution of
dy
dx
(x) =
1
Hξ (x,Z ′(x, x∗), q(x, x∗))
,
y(x∗) = 0,
and let Jx∗ the intersection of its domain with [0, x
∗]. Then
(1) Ix∗ ⊇ Jx∗ ⊇]x∗W , x∗[;
(2) Z(·, x∗) is strictly monotone increasing in ]x∗W , x∗[, and Z(x, x∗) > 0 for all x ∈
]x∗W , x
∗];
(3) q(x, x∗) ∈]0, 1] for all x ∈]x∗W , x∗].
Proof.
1. We first claim that q(·, x∗) is non-increasing on Jx∗
⋂
]x∗W , x
∗[ and thus
(4.22)
q′(x, x∗) =
[r + λ+ v∗(x,Z ′(x, x∗))] · q(x, x∗)− (r + λ)
Hξ(x,Z ′(x, x∗), q(x, x∗))
≤ 0, for all x ∈ Jx∗∩]x∗W , x∗[ .
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By contradiction, assume that there exists x1 ∈ JB∩]xBW , x∗[ such that
(4.23)
q′(x1, x
∗) =
[r + λ+ v∗(x1, Z
′(x1, x
∗))] · q(x1, x∗)− (r + λ)
Hξ(x1, Z ′(x, x∗), q(x, x∗))
= 0, and q′′(x1, x
∗) < 0 .
This yields
r + λ = [r + λ+ v∗(x1, Z
′(x1, x
∗))] · q(x1, x∗) and q(x1, x∗) > 0.
Two cases are considered:
• if x1Z ′(x1, x∗) ≤ c′(0) then, recalling the monotonicity of Z ′(·, x∗), we have that
xV ′(x, x∗) ≤ c′(0) for all x ∈ Jx∗∩]x∗W , x∗[ satisfying x ≤ x1, and so
v∗(x,Z ′(x, x∗)) = 0, for all x ∈ Jx∗∩]x∗W , x∗ [with x ≤ x1.
Thus, q(x1, x
∗) = 1 and
q′(x, x∗) =
[r + λ] · [q(x, x∗)− 1]
Hξ(x,Z ′(x, x∗), q(x, x∗))
for all x ∈ Jx∗∩]x∗W , x∗[ with x ≤ x1.
This implies that q(x, x∗) = 1 for all x ∈ Jx∗∩]x∗W , x∗[ with x ≤ x1. In particular,
we have q′′(x1, x
∗) = 0, which yields a contradiction.
• If x1Z ′(x1, x∗) > c′(0) then
d
dx
(v∗(x1, Z
′(x1, x
∗))) =
Z ′′(x1, x
∗)x1 + Z
′(x1, x
∗)
c′′(x1Z ′(x1, x∗))
> 0.
From the first equation of (4.8) and (4.11), it holds
rZ ′(x1, x
∗) = Hx(x1, Z
′, q) +Hξ(x1, Z
′, q) · Z ′′(x1, x∗) +Hp(x1, Z, q) · q′(x1, x∗)
=
[
(λ+ r)− q(x1, x∗)(λ+ µ+ v∗(x,Z ′)
]
· Z
′
q
+Hξ(x1, Z
′, q) · Z ′′(x1, x∗)
= (r − µ) · Z ′(x1, x∗) +Hξ(x1, Z ′, q) · Z ′′(x1, x∗).
Observe that Z ′(x1, x
∗) > 0 and Hξ(x1, Z
′(x1, x
∗), q(x1, x
∗)) > 0, one obtains that
Z ′′(x1, x
∗) =
µZ ′(x1, x
∗)
Hξ(x1, Z ′(x1, x∗), q(x1, x∗))
> 0 .
Taking the derivative respect to x in both sides of the second equation of (4.8), we
have[
r + λ+ (v∗(x,Z ′(x, x∗))
] · q′(x, x∗) + q(x, x∗) · d
dx
v∗(x,Z ′(x, x∗))
= q′′(x, x∗)Hξ(x,Z
′(x, x∗), q(x, x∗)) + q′(x, x∗)
d
dx
Hξ(x,Z
′(x, x∗), q(x, x∗)) .
Recalling (4.23), we obtain that
(4.24) q′′(x1, x
∗) =
q(x1, x
∗)
Hξ(x1, Z ′, q)
· d
dx
v∗(x1, Z
′(x1, x
∗)) > 0.
and it yields a contradiction.
Now assume that there exists x2 ∈ Jx∗∩]x∗W , x∗[ such thatHξ(x2, Z ′(x2, x∗), q(x2, x∗)) =
0. One has that
ξ♯(x2, q(x2, x
∗)) = Z ′(x2, x
∗) and Z(x2, x
∗) =
1
r
·Hmax(x2, q(x2, x∗)).
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Moreover,
u♯(x2, q(x2, x
∗)) =
[
(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ+ v♯(x2, q(x2, x∗)))q(x2, x∗)
] · x2 .
On the other hand, since q(x2, x
∗) ≤ r + λ
r + λ+ v♯(x,Z ′(x2, x∗))
, we estimate
Hmax(x2, q(x2, x
∗)) = L(u♯(x2, q(x2, x
∗))) + c(v♯(x2, q(x2, x
∗)))
= L
([
(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ+ v♯(x2, q(x2, x∗)))q(x2, x∗)
] · x2)+ c(v♯(x2, q(x2, x∗)))
≥ L
(
r + λ(r − µ)x2
λ+ µ+ v♯(x2, q(x2, x∗))
)
+ c(v♯(x2, q(x2, x
∗)))
≥ Hmax(x1, pc(x2)).
Thus,
Z(x2, x
∗) =
1
r
·Hmax(x2, q(x2, x∗)) ≥ 1
r
·Hmax(x2, pc(x2)) = W (x2),
and it yields a contradiction.
2. By construction, y(·) is strictly monotone and invertible in ]x∗W , x∗], let x = x(y) be
its inverse, from the inverse function theorem we get
d
dy
Z(x(y), x∗) = Z ′(x(y), x∗) ·Hξ (x(y), Z ′(x(y), x∗), q(x(y), x∗)) ,
d
dy
q(x(y), x∗) = q′(x(y), x∗) ·Hξ (x(y), Z ′(x(y), x∗), q(x(y), x∗)) .
Since the map ξ 7→ H(x, ξ, q) is concave, it holds
Hξ(x, 0, q(x, x
∗)) ≥ Hξ(x, ξ, q(x, x∗)) ≥ Hξ
(
x,Z ′(x, x∗), q(x, x∗)
)
,
for all ξ ∈ [0, Z ′(x, x∗)]. We have
rZ(x(y), x∗) = H
(
x(y), Z ′(x(y), x∗), q(x(y), x∗)
)
=
∫ Z′(x(y),x∗)
0
Hξ(x, ξ, q(x(y), x
∗)) dξ
≥ Z ′(x(y), x∗) ·Hξ(x,Z(x(y), x∗), q(x(y), x∗)) = d
dy
Z(x(y), x∗)
and this yields Z(x, x∗) ≥ Bery(x) > 0 for all x ∈]x∗W , x∗].
With a similar argument for q(·, x∗), we obtain
(r + λ+ v∗(x(y), Z ′(x(y), x∗)) · q(x(y), x∗)− (r + λ) = d
dy
q(x(y), x∗)),
and so
(r + λ)(q(x(y), x∗)− 1) ≤ d
dy
q(x(y), x∗) ≤ (r + λ+ v∗(x(y), Z ′(x(y), x∗)) · q(x(y), x∗),
which in particular implies that for all x ∈ Ix∗ ∩ [0, x∗]
q(x, x∗) ≤ 1, q(x, x∗) ≥ θ(x∗) · e(r+λ+v∗(x,Z′(x,x∗))y(x) > 0,
and so q(x, x∗) ∈]0, 1] for all x ∈]x∗W , x∗].
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As far as the graph of Z(·, x∗) intersects the graph of W (·), we have that Z(·, x∗) is
no longer optimal. We investigate now the local behavior of Z(·, x∗) and W (·) near to an
intersection of their graphs.
Lemma 4.12 (Comparison between optimal constant strategy and backward solution).
Let I ⊆]0, x∗[ be an open interval, (Z, q) : I → [0,+∞[×]0, 1[ be a backward solution, and
x ∈ I¯. Assume that
lim
x→x¯
x∈I
Z(x) = W (x¯).
Then pc(x¯) ≥ lim sup
x→x¯
x∈I
q(x) and W ′(x) < F−(x,W (x), pc(x)).
Proof. Let {xj}j∈N ⊆ I be a sequence converging to x¯ and qx¯ ∈ [0, 1] be such that qx¯ =
lim sup
x→x¯+
q(x) = lim
j→∞
q(xj). By assumption, we have
Hmax(x, pc(x)) = lim
j→+∞
H
(
xj , Z
′(xj), q(xj)
) ≤ lim
j→+∞
Hmax(xj , q(xj)) = H
max(x¯, qx¯).
Recalling Lemma 4.2 (4), we have pc(x¯) ≥ qx¯. By Proposition 4.9, we have W ′(x¯) <
ξ♯(x¯, pc(x¯)), and so
H(x¯,W ′(x¯), pc(x¯)) < H
max(x¯, pc(x¯)) = rW (x¯),
thus, by applying the strictly increasing map F−(x¯, ·, pc(x)) on both sides, we obtain
W ′(x) < F−(x,W (x), pc(x)).
On the other hand, since the functions F−(x,Z, q) and G−(x,Z, q) are smooth for
Hξ(x,Z, q) 6= 0 but not only Hölder continuous with respect to Z near to the surface
Σ = {(x,Z, q) | Hξ(x,Z, q) = 0} .
Thus, for any x0 ∈ [0, x∗), the definition of the solution of the Cauchy problem
(4.25)

Z ′(x) = F−(x,Z(x), q(x)),
q′(x) = G−(x,Z(x), q(x)),
with

Z(x0) = W (x0) ,
q(x0) = pc(x0).
requires some care.
For any ε > 0, we denote by Zε(·, x0), qε(·, x0) the backward solution to (4.25) with the
terminal data
Zε(x0, x0) = W (y0)− ε and qε(x0, x0) = pc(x0).
With the same argument in the proof of proposition 4.11, this solution is uniquely defined
on a maximal interval [aε(x0), x0] such that Zε(·, x0) is increasing, qε(·, x0) is decreasing
and
Zε(aε(x0), x0) = W (aε(x0)), qε(aε(x0), x0) ≤ pc(aε(x0)) .
Let x♭ be the unique solution to the equation
(4.26) c′(0) = x · L′((r − µ)x) .
It is clear that 0 < x♭ < xc where xc is defined in Proposition 4.9 as the unique solution
to the equaiton
(r + λ)c′(0) = (r − µ)xL′ ((r − µ)x) .
Two cases are considered:
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• CASE 1: For any x0 ∈ (0, x♭], we claim that
aε(x0) = 0, qε(x, x0) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, x0] ,
and Zε(·, x0) solves backward the following ODE
(4.27) Z ′(x) = F−(x,Z(x), 1), Z(x0) = W (x0)− ε
for ε > 0 sufficiently small. Indeed, let Z1 be the unique backward solution of
(4.27). From (4.14), it holds
F−(x,W (x), 1) = ξ♯(x, 1) = L′((r − µ)x) > r − µ
r
· L′((r − µ)x) = W ′(x)
for all x ∈ (0, x♭]. As in [5]A contradiction argument yields
0 < Z1(x) < W (x) for all x ∈]0, x0] .
Thus, Z1 is well-defined on [0, x0] and Z1(0) = 0. On the other hand, it holds
Z ′(x1) = F
−(x,Z(x), 1) ≤ ξ♯(x, 1) = L′((r − µ)x) ≤ L′((r − µ)x♭)
for all x ≤ x♭ and (4.26) implies that
v∗(x,Z ′1(x)) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x♭] .
Therefore, (Z1(x), 1) solves (4.25) and the uniqueness yields
Zε(x, x0) = Z1(x) and qε(x, x0) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, x0] .
Thanks to the monotone increasing property of the map ξ → F−(x, ξ, 1), a pair
(Z(·, x0), q(·, x0)) denoted by
q(x, x0) = 1 and Z(x, x0) = sup
ε>0
Zε(x, x0) for all x ∈ [0, x0]
is the unique solution of (4.25). If the initial size of the debt is x¯ ∈ [0, x0] we
think of Z(x¯, x0) is as the expected cost of (4.4)-(4.5) with p(·, x0) = 1, x(0) = x0
achieved by the feedback strategies
(4.28) u(x, x0) = argmin
w∈[0,1]
{
L(w)− Z ′(x, x0) · w
}
, v(x, x0) = 0
for all x ∈ [0, x0]. With this strategy, the debt has the asymptotic behavior x(t)→
x0 as t→∞.
• CASE 2: For x0 ∈ (x♭, x∗W ], system of ODEs (4.25) does not admit a unique
solution in general since it is not monotone, it. The following lemma will provide
the existence result of (4.25) for all x0 ∈ (x♭, x∗W ].
Lemma 4.13. There exists a constant δ♭ > 0 depending only on x
♭ such that for
any x0 ∈
(
x♭, x∗W
)
, it holds
x0 − aε(x0) ≥ δx♭ for all ε ∈ (0, ε0)
for some ε0 > 0 sufficiently small.
Proof. From (4.19) and (4.14), it holds
inf
x∈[x♭,x∗W ]
{
ξ♯(x, pc(x))−W ′(x)
}
= δ1,♭ > 0 .
In particular, we have
F−(x0,W (x0), pc(x0))−W ′(x0) = δ1,♭ .
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By continuity of the map η 7→ F−(x0, η, pc(x0)) on [0,W (x)], one can find a con-
stant ε1 > 0 sufficiently small such that
F−(x0, η, pc(x0)) ≥ W ′(x0) +
δ1,♭
2
for all ξ ∈ [W (x0)− ε1,W (x0)] .
On the other hand, the continuity of W ′ yields
δ2,♭ = sup
{
s ≥ 0
∣∣∣ W ′(x0 − τ) < W ′(x0) + δ1,♭
4
for all τ ∈ [0, s]
}
> 0 .
For a fixed ε ∈ (0, ε1), denote by
x1
.
= inf
{
s ∈ (0, x0]
∣∣∣ F−(x,Zε(x, x0), qε(x, x0)) > W ′(x) for all x ∈ (s, x0]} .
If x1 > x0 − δ2,x¯ then it holds
(4.29) F−
(
x1, Zε(x1, x0), qε(x1, x0)
)
= W ′(x1) ≤ W ′(x0) +
δ1,♭
4
and there exists x2 ∈ (x1, x0] such that
(4.30) F−
(
x2, Zε(x2, x0), qε(x2, x0)
)
= W ′(x0) +
δ1,♭
2
and
(4.31) F− (x,Zε(x, x0), qε(x, x0)) ≤ W ′(x0) +
δ1,♭
2
for all x ∈ [x1, x2] .
Recalling that the function (x, η, p) 7→ F−(x, η, p) is defined byH(x, F−(x, η, p), p) =
rη, by the implicit function theorem, set ξ = F−(x, η, p), we have
∂
∂p
F−(x, η, p) = −Hp(x, ξ, p)
Hξ(x, ξ, p)
=
ξ
p
· u
∗(x, ξ, p) − x(λ+ r)
u∗(x, ξ, p)− x(λ+ r) + xp(λ+ µ+ v∗(x, ξ))
=
(
1 +
x(λ+ µ+ v∗(x, ξ)
Hξ(x, ξ, p)
)
ξ
p
>
F−(x, η, p)
p
> 0 .
Since qε(·, x0) is decreasing, it holds
F−
(
x1, Zε(x1, x0), qε(x1, x0)
) ≥ F−(x1, Zε(x1, x0), qε(x2, x0)) ,
and (4.29)-(4.30) yield
F−
(
x2, Zε(x2, x0), qε(x2, x0)
) − F−(x1, Zε(x1, x0), qε(x2, x0)) ≥ δ1,♭
4
.
On the other hand, from (4.11) one shows that the map x→ F−(x, η, p) is mono-
tone decreasing and thus
(4.32) F−
(
x2, Zε(x2, x0), qε(x2, x0)
)− F−(x2, Zε(x1, x0), qε(x2, x0)) ≥ δ1,♭
4
.
Observe that the map η → F−(x, η, p) is Hölder continuous due to Lemma 2.4.
More precisely, there exist a constant Cx♭ > 0 such that∣∣F−(x, η2, p)− F−(x, η1, p)∣∣ ≤ Cx♭ · ∣∣η2 − η1∣∣ 12
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for all η1, η2 ∈ (0,W (x)], x ∈ [x¯, x∗], p ∈ [θ(x∗), 1]. From (4.32) it holds
|Zε(x2, x0)− Zε(x1, x0)| ≥
δ21,♭
16C2
x♭
.
Recalling (4.31), we have
Z ′ε(x, x0) = F
− (x,Zε(x, x0), qε(x, x0)) ≤ W ′(x0) +
δ1,x♭
2
for all x ∈ [x1, x2]
and it yields
|x2 − x1| ≥
δ2
1,x♭
8C2
x♭
[2W ′(x0) + δ1,x♭ ]
.
Therefore,
x0 − aε(x0) ≥ δx♭ .= min
{
δ1,x♭ ,
δ2
1,x♭
8C2
x♭
[2W ′(x0) + δ1,x♭ ]
}
> 0 .
Remark 4.14. In general, the backward Cauchy problem (4.25) may admits more
than one solution.
As a consequence of Lemma 4.13 , there exists a sequence {εn}n≥0 → 0+ such
that {(Zεn(·, x0), qεn(·, x0))}n≥1 converges to (Z(·, x0), q(·, x0)) which is a solution
of (4.25). With the same argument in the proof of proposition 4.11, we can extend
backward the solution (Z(·, x0), q(·, x0)) until a(x0) such that
lim
x→a(x0)+
Z(a(x0), x0) = W (a(x0)),
and Lemma 4.12 yields limx→a(x0)+ q(a(x0), x0) ≤ pc(a(x0)). If the initial size of
the debt is x¯ ∈ [a(x0), x0] we think of Z(x¯, x0) is as the expected cost of (4.4)-(4.5)
with p(·, x0), x(0) = x0 achieved by the feedback strategies
(4.33)
u(x, x0) = argmin
w∈[0,1]
{
L(w)− Z
′(x, x0)
p(x, x0)
· w
}
, v(x, x0) = argmin
v≥0
{
c(v)−vxZ ′(x, x0)
}
.
With this strategy, the debt has the asymptotic behavior x(t)→ x0 as t→∞.
We are now ready to to construct an equilibrium solution in the feedback form by a
suitable concatenation of backward solutions. By induction, we define a family of back
solutions as follows:
x1
.
= x∗W , (Z1(x), q1(x)) = (Z(x, x
∗), q(x, x∗)) for all x ∈ [x1, x∗]
and
xn+1
.
= a(xn), (Z(x, xn), q(x, xn)) for all x ∈ [xn+1, xn] .
From Case 1 and Lemma 4.13, there exists a natural number N0 < 1 +
x∗ − x♭
δx♭
such that
our construction will be stop in N0 step, i.e.,
xN0 > 0, a(xN0) = 0 and lim
x→a(xN0 )
Z(x, xN0) = 0 .
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O x3 x2 x1 x
∗
B
x♭
W (x)
Z(x)
Z1(x)
Z2(x)
Z3(x)
Figure 2. Construction of a solution: starting from (x∗, B) we solve back-
ward the system until the first touch with the graph of W at (x1,W (x1)).
Then we restart by solving backward the system with the new terminal
conditions (W (x1), pc(x1)), until the next touch with the graph of W at
(x2,W (x2)) and so on. In a finite number of steps we reach the ori-
gin. If a touch occurs at xn0 < x
♭ then the backward solution from xn0
reaches the origin with q ≡ 1. Given an initial value x¯ of the DTI, if
0 ≤ xn+1 < x¯ < xn < x1 the the optimal strategy let the DTI increase
asymptotically to xn (no banktuptcy), while if x1 < x¯ < x
∗ then the opti-
mal strategy let the DTI increase to x∗, thus providing bankruptcy in finite
time.
We will show that a feedback equilibrium solution to the debt management problem is
obtained as follows
(4.34)
(V ∗(x), p∗(x)) =

(Z(x, x∗), q(x, x∗)) for all x ∈ (xW , x∗],
(Z(x, xk), q(x, xk)) for all x ∈ (a(xk), xk], k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N0} .
.
(4.35) u∗(x) = argmin
w∈[0,1]
{
L(w)− (V
∗)′(x)
p∗(x)
· w
}
,
(4.36) v∗(x) = argmin
v≥0
{
c(v) − vx(V ∗)′(x)} .
Before going to state our main theorem, let us recall from Proposition 4.9 that vc is the
unique solution to
c′(v) =
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
(r + λ+ v)2
· L′
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x
r + λ+ v
)
,
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and
pc(x
∗) =
r + λ
r + λ+ vc(x∗)
< 1 ,
(4.37) W (x∗) =
1
r
[
L
(
(r + λ)(r − µ)x∗
r + λ+ vc(x∗)
)
+ c(vc(x
∗))
]
.
Theorem 4.15. Assume that the cost functions L and c satisfies the assumptions (A1)-
(A2), and moreover
(4.38) W (x∗) > B and θ(x∗) ≤ pc(x∗) .
Then the function V ∗, p∗, u∗ and v∗ provide an equilibrium solution to the debt management
problem (4.1)-(4.3), in feedback form.
Proof. From the monotone increasing property of the maps p 7→ F−(x∗,W (x∗), p), η 7→
F−(x∗, η, θ(x∗)) and ξ 7→ v∗(x∗, ξ), we have
θ(x∗) · (r + λ+ v∗(x∗, F−(x∗, B, θ(x∗)))
< pc(x
∗) · (r + λ+ v∗(x∗, F−(x∗,W (x∗), pc(x∗))) = r + λ
and it yields (4.21). By Proposition 4.11 and Lemma 4.13, a pair V ∗(·), p∗(·) in (4.34)
is well-defined on [0, x∗]. In the remaining steps, we show that V ∗, p∗, u∗, v∗ provide an
equilibrium solution. Namely, they satisfy the properties (i)-(ii) in Definition 4.1.
1. To prove (i), call V (·) the value function for the optimal control problem (4.4)-(4.5).
For any initial value, x(0) = x0 ∈ [0, x∗], the feedback control u∗ and v∗ in (4.35)-(4.36)
yields the cost V ∗(x0). This implies
V (x0) ≤ V ∗(x0) .
To prove the converse inequality we need to show that, for any measurable control u :
[0,+∞[ 7→ [0, 1] and v : [0,+∞[→ [0,+∞[, calling t 7→ x(t) the solution to
(4.39) x˙(t) =
(
λ+ r
p∗(x(t))
− λ− µ− v(t)
)
x(t)− u(t)
p∗(x(t))
, x(0) = x0 ,
one has
(4.40)
∫ Tb
0
e−rt[L(u(x(t))) + c(v(x(t)))] dt + e−rTbB ≥ V ∗(x0),
where
Tb = inf
{
t ≥ 0 ; x(t) = x∗}
is the bankruptcy time (possibly with Tb = +∞).
For t ∈ [0, Tb], consider the absolutely continuous function
φu,v(t)
.
=
∫ t
0
e−rs · [L(u(s)) + c(v(s))] ds+ e−rtV ∗(x(t)).
At any Lebesgue point t of u(·) and v(·), recalling that (V ∗, p∗) solves the system (4.8),
we compute
d
dt
φu,v(t) = e−rt ·
[
L(u(t)) + c(v(t)) − rV ∗(x(t)) + (V ∗)′(x(t)) · x˙(t)
]
= e−rt ·
[
L(u(t)) + c(v(t)) − rV ∗(x(t))
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+ (V ∗)′(x(t))
((
λ+ r
p∗(x(t))
− λ− µ− v(t)
)
x(t)− u(t)
p∗(x(t))
)]
≥ e−rt ·
[
min
ω∈[0,1]
{
L(ω)− (V
∗)′(x(t))
p∗(x(t))
ω
}
+ min
ζ∈[0+∞[
{
c(ζ)− (V ∗)′(x(t))x(t) ζ}
+
(
λ+ r
p∗(x(t))
− λ− µ
)
x(t)(V ∗)′(x(t))− rV ∗(x(t))
]
= e−rt ·
[
H
(
x(t), (V ∗)′(x(t)), p∗(x(t))
) − rV ∗(x(t))] = 0.
Therefore,
V ∗(x0) = φ
u,v(0) ≤ lim
t→Tb−
φu,v(t) =
∫ Tb
0
e−rt · [L(u(t)) + c(v(t))] dt+ e−rTbB,
proving (4.40).
2. It remains to check (ii). The case x0 = 0 is trivial. Two main cases will be considered.
CASE 1: x0 ∈]x1, x∗]. Then x(t) > x1 for all t ∈ [0, Tb]. This implies
x˙(t) = Hξ(x(t), Z(x(t), x
∗), q(x(t), x∗)) .
From the second equation in (4.8) it follows
d
dt
p(x(t)) = p′(x(t))x˙(t) = (r + λ+ v∗(x(t)))p(x(t)) − (r + λ),
Therefore, for every t ∈ [0, Tb] one has
p(x(0)) = p(t) ·
∫ t
0
e−(r+λ+v
∗(x(τ))) dτ +
∫ t
0
(r + λ)
∫ τ
0
e−(r+λ+v
∗(x(s))) ds dτ
Letting t→ Tb we obtain
p(x0) =
∫ Tb
0
(r + λ)
∫ τ
0
e−(r+λ+v
∗(x(s))) ds dτ + θ(x∗) ·
∫ Tb
0
e−(r+λ+v
∗(x(τ))) dτ
proving (ii).
CASE 2: x0 ∈ [a(xk), xk[ for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N0}.. In this case, Tb = +∞ and x(t) ∈
[axk , xk[ such that
lim
t→+∞
x(t) = xk .
With a similar computation, one has
p(x0) = θ(x
∗) ·
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λ+v
∗(x(τ))) dτ
proving (ii).
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As in the stochastic case, we now study the behavior of the total cost for servicing when
the maximum size x∗ of the DTI, at which bankruptcy is declared, becomes very large.
Proposition 4.16. Let (V (x, x∗), p(x, x∗)) be constructed in Theorem 4.15. The following
holds:
(i) if lim sup
s→+∞
θ(s)s = R < +∞ then
(4.41) lim inf
x∗→+∞
V (x, x∗) ≥ B ·
(
1− R
x
) r
r+λ
for all
x ≥ 1
r − µ ·max
{
4,
4B
L′(0)
,
4C1B
c′(0)
, 2C1c
−1(rB)
}
.
(ii) if lim
s→+∞
θ(s)s = +∞ then
(4.42) lim sup
x∗→∞
V (x, x∗) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x∗[
Proof. 1. Let’s first provide an upper bound on v(·, x∗). For all x ≥ 4r−µ , from (4.8) and
(4.10), we estimate
H(x, ξ, p) ≥ min
v≥0
{c(v) − xξv}+ [(r − µ)x− 1] · ξ
p
≥ min
v≥0
{c(v) − xξv}+ (r − µ)x
2
· ξ
p
.
= K(x, ξ, p)
for all ξ, p > 0 and x ≥ 2
r − µ . One computes
Kξ(x, ξ, p) =
(r − µ)x
2p
− xvK
where
vK =

0, if 0 ≤ xξ < c′(0),
(c′)−1(xξ), if xξ ≥ c′(0) > 0.
This implies that the maximum of K is achieved for vK =
r−µ
2p and its value is
max
ξ≥0
K(x, ξ, p) = K(x, ξK , p) = c
(
r − µ
2p
)
with ξK =
c′(vK)
x
.
Thus, the monotone increasing property of the map ξ → H(x, ξ, p(x, x∗)) on the interval[
0, ξ♯(x, p(x, x∗))
]
implies that
(4.43) F−(x, V (x, x∗), p(x, x∗)) < ξK =⇒ v(x, x∗) ≤ r − µ
2p(x, x∗)
.
provided that c
(
r−µ
2p(x,x∗)
)
≥ rB. From (4.8)) and (4.10), one has
rB ≥− xV ′(x, x∗)v(x, x∗) + [(r − µ)x− u(x, x∗)] · V
′(x, x∗)
p(x, x∗)
≥
[
(r − µ)x
2
− 1
]
· V
′(x, x∗)
p(x, x∗)
≥ (r − µ)x
4
· V
′(x, x∗)
p(x, x∗)
.
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Thus, if
(4.44)
p(x, x∗) ≤ min
{
r − µ
2c−1(rB)
,
(r − µ)c′(0)
4B
}
and x ≥ max
{
4
r − µ,
4B
(r − µ)L′(0)
}
then
(4.45)
V ′(x, x∗)
p(x, x∗)
≤ 4B
(r − µ)x ≤ L
′(0) =⇒ u(x, x∗) = 0 .
and
(4.46) V ′(x, x∗)x ≤ 4B
r − µ · p(x, x
∗) ≤ c′(0) =⇒ v(x, x∗) = 0 .
In this case, from (4.8), (4.10) and (4.11), it holds
(r + λ)(p(x, x∗)− 1) =
(
λ+ r
p(x, x∗)
− λ− µ
)
xp′(x, x∗) .
Thus,
p(x, x∗) =
θ(x∗)x∗
x
·
(
1− p(x, x∗)
1− θ(x∗)
) r−µ
r+λ
provided that (4.44) holds.
2. Assume that
lim sup
s∈[0,+∞)
θ(s)s = R < +∞ ,
we have
sup
s∈[0,+∞)
θ(s)s = C1
for some C1 < +∞. Since p(·, x∗) is increasing, it holds
(4.47) p(x, x∗) ≤ θ(x
∗)x∗
x
≤ C1
x
if (4.44) holds .
Denote by
M
.
=
1
r − µ ·max
{
4,
4B
L′(0)
,
4C1B
c′(0)
, 2C1c
−1(rB)
}
,
we then have
u(x, x∗) = v(x, x∗) = 0 for all x ∈ [M,x∗], x∗ ≥M .
Recalling (4.8), (4.10) and (4.11), we have
(4.48)

V ′(x, x∗) =
rp
[(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ)p(x, x∗)]x V ,
p′(x, x∗) = (λ+ r) · p(x, x
∗)(p(x, x∗)− 1)
[(λ+ r)− (λ+ µ)p(x, x∗)]x .
for all x ∈ [M,x∗] with x∗ ≥M . Solving the above ODE, we obtain that
V (x, x∗) = B ·
(
1− p(x, x∗)
1− θ(x∗)
) r
r+λ
, p(x, x∗) =
θ(x∗)x∗
x
·
(
1− p(x, x∗)
1− θ(x∗)
) r−µ
r+λ
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for all x ≥ [M,x∗]. Thus,
lim inf
x∗→+∞
V (x, x∗) ≥ B ·
(
1− R
x
) r
r+λ
for all x ≥M
and it yields (4.41).
3. We are now going to prove (ii). Assume that
(4.49) lim sup
s→+∞
θ(s)s = +∞ .
Set
γ
.
= min
{
r − µ
2c−1(rB)
,
(r − µ)c′(0)
4B
}
and M2
.
= max
{
4
r − µ,
4B
(r − µ)L′(0)
}
.
For any x∗ > M2, denote by
τ(x∗)
.
=

x∗ if θ(x∗) ≥ γ ,
inf
{
x ≥M2
∣∣∣ p(x, x∗) ≤ γ} if θ(x∗) < γ .
From (4.44)–(4.46), the decreasing property of p yields
(4.50) p(x, x∗) ≥ γ for all x ∈ [M2, τ(x∗)[
and
p(x, x∗) < γ =⇒ u(x, x∗) = v(x, x∗) for all x ∈ [τ(x∗), x∗] .
As in the step 2, for any x ∈ [τ(x∗), x∗], we have
V (x, x∗) = B ·
(
1− p(x, x∗)
1− θ(x∗)
) r
r+λ
, p(x, x∗) =
θ(x∗)x∗
x
·
(
1− p(x, x∗)
1− θ(x∗)
) r−µ
r+λ
This implies that
(4.51) V (x, x∗) = B ·
(
p(x, x∗)x
θ(x∗)x∗
) r
r−µ
≤ B ·
(
x
θ(x∗)x∗
) r
r−µ
for all x ∈ [τ(x∗), x∗]. On the other hand, for any x ∈ [M2, τ(x∗)], from (4.8), (4.10) and
(4.50), it holds
rV (x, x∗) ≤ r + λ
p(x, x∗)
xV ′(x, x∗) ≤ (r + λ)x
γ
· V ′(x, x∗) .
This implies that
(4.52) V (x, x∗) ≤ V (τ(x∗), x∗) ·
(
x
τ(x∗)
) rγ
r+λ
≤ B ·
(
x
τ(x∗)
) rγ
r+λ
for all x ∈ [M2, τ(x∗)].
For any fix x0 ≥M2, we will prove that
(4.53) lim sup
x∗→+∞
V (x0, x
∗) = 0
Two cases are considered:
• If lim supx∗→+∞ τ(x∗) = +∞ then (4.52) yields
lim
x∗→+∞
V (x0, x
∗) ≤ lim inf
x∗→+∞
B ·
(
x0
τ(x∗)
) rγ
r+λ
= 0 .
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• If lim supx∗→+∞ τ(x∗) < +∞ then
τ(x∗) < M3 for all x
∗ > 0
for some M3 > 0. Recalling (4.51) and (4.49), we obtain that
lim
x∗→∞
V (x0, x
∗) ≤ lim
x∗→∞
V (x0 +M3, x
∗) ≤ lim
x∗→∞
B ·
(
x0 +M3
θ(x∗)x∗
) r
r−µ
= 0 .
Thus, (4.53) holds and the increasing property of V (·, x∗) yields (4.42).
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